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|--|------------------------------------|--|--|---|---|
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 18-12-2014 | | 2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis (First Draft) | | 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 21-07-2014 to 12-06-2015 | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Iraq Stability: Foreign Military Sales in a New War Environment | | | | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5b. GRANT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | |
| 6. AUTHOR Alonzo J. Jones III | | | | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5e. TASK NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton Blvd Norfolk, VA 23511-1702 | | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT | |
| 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) | |
| | | | | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. | | | | | |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | | |
| 14. ABSTRACT The United States uses Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs as a way and means to achieve strategic security cooperation ends with foreign nations. Since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized territory in Iraq in early 2014, U.S.-Iraq FMS sales mainly consisted of emergent requirements such as ammunition and weapons. U.S. FMS strategy in Iraq should focus on counterterrorism operations, increase end-user monitoring of U.S. equipment, and increase direct commercial sales to defeat ISIL in a new war context. | | | | | |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS | | | | | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: Unclassified | | | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unlimited | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 49 | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT Unclassified | b. ABSTRACT Unclassified | c. THIS PAGE Unclassified | | | 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 757-443-6301 |

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



IRAQ STABILITY:
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES IN A NEW WAR ENVIRONMENT
by
Alonzo J. Jones
Civilian, U.S. Department of Defense

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY



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
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

The United States uses Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs as a way and means to achieve strategic security cooperation ends with foreign nations. In Iraq, the United States uses FMS as a diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instrument of national power to influence political-military action, train Iraqi Security Forces, and to benefit both nations economically. The United States remains Iraq's preferred FMS provider despite Russian competition and the bureaucratic FMS process. The sales promote Iraq's security and stability, U.S.-Iraq security cooperation, and U.S. defense sales and acquisition programs. Since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized territory in Iraq in early 2014, U.S.-Iraq FMS sales mainly consisted of emergent requirements such as ammunition and weapons; the security situation delayed larger cases including F-16 deliveries.¹ U.S. FMS strategy in Iraq should focus on counterterrorism operations, increase end-user monitoring of U.S. equipment, and increase direct commercial sales to defeat ISIL in a new war context. The recommendations in this thesis seek to inform U.S. policymakers on future U.S. FMS strategy to Iraq and other countries where FMS agreements do not address asymmetric threat requirements or meet expected delivery timelines.

¹ Richard Tomkins, "Iraq Seeks Rockets, Vehicle Spare Parts," *United Press International*, November 13, 2014, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2014/11/13/Iraq-seeks-rockets-vehicle-spare-parts/5391415894099/ (accessed December 12, 2014).

DEDICATION

To my brothers, sisters, leaders, mentors, and friends in the United States Marine Corps and Joint Force: it was my honor to serve with you in uniform and now as a civilian. To the dedicated personnel in Defense Attaché Office Baghdad and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, thank you for all that you continue to do in support of the Iraq mission.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

To the intelligence professionals and leadership in the Defense Intelligence Agency Middle East Africa Regional Center, I thank you for your patience and guidance throughout my time working the Iraq problem set and for the opportunity to attend the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS). To the members of JAWS Class 2014-2015, especially Seminar Two and staff including Dr. Keith Dickson, Colonel J.J. Torres, Colonel Pete Yeager, Mark McAlpine, and Dr. Gregory Miller, I thank you for your professionalism, humor, and knowledge imparted over the past year. This course has been the highlight of my professional civilian career.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Purpose and Background

This thesis analyzes how and why events in Iraq over the past 12 years affected Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, assesses the threat of competing Russian to Iraq arms sales, and determines the future of Iraq FMS sales considering the nature of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) conflict. U.S. FMS strategy in Iraq should focus on counterterrorism operations, increase end-user monitoring of U.S. equipment, and increase direct commercial sales to defeat ISIL in a new war context. The recommendations in this thesis seek to inform U.S. policymakers on future U.S. FMS strategy to Iraq and other countries where FMS agreements do not address asymmetric threat requirements or meet expected delivery timelines.

The United States uses FMS programs as a way and means to achieve strategic ends with foreign nations. In Iraq, the United States uses FMS as a diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instrument of national power to influence political-military action and economically benefit both nations. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) runs the FMS program under U.S. Chief of Mission-Baghdad authority with the oversight and advice from personnel in Washington, D.C., including the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. FMS programs, or cases, require Congressional approval to ensure

proper funding allocation and assurances that U.S. weapons and technology will not fall into the hands of adversaries.¹

From 2004-2011 in Iraq, the United States designed FMS and other security cooperation initiatives to promote a stable security environment, an inclusive democratic government, and to secure a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). However, former Prime Minister (PM) Nuri Al-Maliki stalled U.S. initiatives and refused to grant U.S. troops in Iraq legal immunities, a prerequisite for the SOFA. The departure of U.S. forces in 2011, largely due to the lack of a SOFA, left Maliki and the ISF to defend themselves in the face of the increasing ISIL threat without U.S. combat troops in Iraq.

The United States remains Iraq's preferred FMS provider despite Russian competition and the bureaucratic FMS process. The sales promote Iraq's internal security and stability, U.S. security cooperation, and U.S. defense sales and acquisition programs. Regional security and balance of power considerations influence FMS programs, and U.S. equipment already fallen into ISIL possession.² U.S. policymakers and military leaders agree the fight against ISIL likely will take years.³

¹ Michael J. Terry, "Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program Helps Iraq Transition to Security Self-Reliance," *Army AL&T Magazine*, April 2009, 6-10, Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed November 6, 2014).

² Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, "The Iraqi Army Was Crumbling Long Before Its Collapse, U.S. Officials Say," *New York Times*, June 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/world/middleeast/american-intelligence-officials-said-iraqi-military-had-been-in-decline.html?_r=0 (accessed January 6, 2014).

³ Eric Schmitt, Michael R. Gordon, and Helene Cooper, "Destroying ISIS May Take Years, U.S. Officials Say," *New York Times*, September 7, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/world/middleeast/destroying-isis-may-take-3-years-white-house-says.html>, (accessed December 12, 2014).

Thesis Approach

This thesis walks the reader through eight chapters relating to the Iraq strategic environment, FMS and competition, the rise of ISIL, and the failure of the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) initial response to ISIL attacks in Iraq. It presents in the following manner.

Chapter 1 serves as the introduction. Chapter 2 introduces the Iraq problem set and lays out the Iraq strategic environment from 2003-2014 in a political-military historical context. It discusses former PM Maliki's sectarian actions and the use of FMS to influence Iraqi policy. Chapter 3 defines and discusses FMS from a U.S. technical point of view describing FMS requirements, benefits, challenges, and options to familiarize the reader with the complexities of the FMS process.

Two case studies frame the issue of FMS competition and sales regarding Iraq. Chapter 4 discusses Iraq and U.S. FMS history, noting cooperation, challenges, and benefits. Chapter 5 discusses Iraq and Russia FMS, to highlight Russia's purpose and challenges to U.S. FMS. The end of Chapter 5 notes regional FMS sales compared to Iraq including Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to provide the reader a lens through which to compare U.S. FMS in Iraq to other countries in the region.

Chapter 6 uses Graham Allison's rational actor, organizational behavior, and governmental politics models to evaluate how the Iraqi government, the Russian Government, and the U.S. Government view FMS sales to Iraq and to help predict future actions in light of recommendations to change the U.S. FMS strategy in Iraq.

Chapter 7 discusses the rise of ISIL and ISF performance. It describes ISIL's move into Iraq and the ineffective ISF response, which led to the capture of Mosul and former U.S. military equipment. It then analyzes new war theory in relation to ISIL to

determine what type of FMS equipment is required to fight ISIL. Finally, Chapter 8 is the conclusion section, designed to provide policymakers with recommendations on future U.S. to Iraq FMS actions.

Chapter 2

The Iraq Strategic Environment

“The war in Iraq presents a distinct and important challenge to the United States, the international community, the Iraqi people, and the region . . . our goal is an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we are continuing to promote an Iraqi Government that is just, representative, and accountable and that denies support and safe haven to terrorists . . . we will continue to train, equip, and advise Iraqi Security Forces . . . sustain a capable political, diplomatic, and civilian effort to help the Iraqi people as they resolve outstanding differences . . . we will continue to pursue comprehensive engagement across the region to ensure that our drawdown in Iraq provides an opportunity to advance lasting security and sustainable development for both Iraq and the broader Middle East.”¹

Introduction

This chapter sets the stage for the rest of the content in this thesis. By describing Iraq’s strategic environment over the past 11 years, it illustrates the importance of FMS sales both to security cooperation and to Iraq’s ability to maintain its fragile democracy and security. The United States plays a large role in Iraq’s future, given U.S. troops were invited back in to advise and train ISF in the fight against ISIL; part of the advise and train role is FMS execution, delivery, and training on new equipment. An ISIL discussion appears at the end of the chapter but is refined in Chapter 7 regarding new war theory and what equipment Iraq needs to fight a new war vice traditional FMS arms procurement.

History

Since the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Iraq has struggled to sustain democratic governance, maintain an ethno-sectarian peace, and provide internal security

¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 25.

for its citizens. Former PM Maliki assumed his position in 2006 as a compromise candidate and Iraq's first Shiite-Arab leader since Sunni Baathist elements seized power in 1968. Maliki walked into a storm of ethno-sectarian division and threats. Kurdish parliament elements, who represent a semi-autonomous region in Northern Iraq, regularly joined Sunni parliament members in walking out of the government. These walkouts and delays resulted in Shia-based executive decisions, failed debate and passage of numerous budgets and laws, and a Shia-dominated ISF personally directed by Maliki.²

At the same time, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) saw a dramatic rise in terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ISIL's predecessor, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. His bombing and rocket attacks wreaked havoc on U.S. and ISF efforts to maintain internal security and stability. Zarqawi attacked both Sunni and Shia populations to foment hatred and violence between the two groups, and by 2007, the situation required a drastic solution. The solution was the surge of MNF-I personnel.³

The goal of the surge was to provide time and space for government leaders in Baghdad to reach political accommodation on issues that fiercely divided them, including a national hydrocarbons law, a revenue sharing law, de-Baathification reform, and disputed areas resolution. The ways and means were a massive influx of MNF-I manpower to make common cause with the Iraqi people, stabilize the security situation, create time for political progress, and train the ISF.⁴

² Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, "Iraq in Crisis", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, May 30, 2014, xii, <http://csis.org/publication/iraq-crisis-1> (accessed October 1, 2014).

³ John F. Burns, "U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent Safehouse," *New York Times*, June 8, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html?pagewanted=all>, (accessed December 12, 2014).

⁴ Senate Armed Services Committee, *The Situation in Iraq and Progress Made by the Government of Iraq in Meeting Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation*, 110th Cong., 2d sess., 2008, S. Hrg. 110-635, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45666/html/CHRG-110shrg45666.htm> (accessed December 12, 2014).

By 2010, with the surge mostly concluded and Zargawi dead, some provinces transferred to purely Iraqi security control, and the United States drew down its forces. Also in 2010 were the second Iraq democratic national elections. The Iraqi Constitution seemed to prohibit a second term for a sitting PM, and Sunnis and Kurds sought a new PM as they viewed Maliki as increasingly authoritative and dismissive of their needs. Maliki had enemies in all three ethno-sectarian political parties, yet won a second term. From this point on, his autocratic and anti-Sunni tendencies grew worse. Maliki feared a Baathist resurgence and reacted violently to any perceived threat.⁵

The autocratic moves by Maliki threatened the Sunni's existence and caused the Kurds to make greater moves towards independence. Neither of these factors reflected U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Yet, the United States continued to work to influence Maliki through other diplomatic, military, and economic means, predominantly emphasized via the U.S. FMS of major weapons systems, including M1A1 Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets. However, time drew short for the United States to achieve its goals. The initial Strategic Framework Agreement, signed by Maliki and U.S. representatives in 2008, expired in December of 2011.

Lack of a new SOFA was a legitimacy and legality problem for U.S. personnel and forces in Iraq.⁶ Without a SOFA, U.S. personnel did not have immunity from Iraqi law. This situation was unacceptable, so United States Forces-Iraq directed a majority of its efforts to securing a SOFA. The goal was for the United States to maintain influence in the region and decrease Iranian influence by basing in Iraq while aiding ISF development. Besides the security and intelligence assets that the United States provided

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Cordesman and Khazai, 8.

to ISF and the Iraqi government, the primary means of influence was FMS. However, there was no reason to think Maliki would follow through on long-term commitments, including FMS deals and basing, given his actions since the beginning of his second term, and specifically from 2010-2011.⁷

Maliki grew even more independent and autocratic in 2011. He sensed that by the end of that year he could be the true unencumbered, uninfluenced leader of Iraq. He demurred during SOFA negotiations and negotiated military equipment deals with numerous other countries, most notably Russia. Maliki sought to throw the Western yoke off his neck, yet he did not realize or appreciate the effects his strategy, or lack thereof, would have on weapons provision and maintenance, internal and external security, and the resurgence of AQI in the name of ISIL once U.S. forces departed.⁸ The stage was set for Maliki's electoral defeat in 2014 and the rise of ISIL. Since that time, Iraq's strategic environment became more complicated and required the United States, at Iraq's request, to deploy personnel in support of advise, assist, and training missions to help combat ISIL.

⁷ Ibid, 10.

⁸ Marisa Sullivan, "Maliki's Authoritarian Regime," *Institute for the Study of War*, April 2013, <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/malikis-authoritarian-regime> (accessed September 18, 2014).

Chapter 3

U.S. Foreign Military Sales

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the U.S. FMS technical process to highlight challenges and difficulties of executing FMS programs, not only to Iraq, but to all U.S. partners. It discusses the FMS history and purpose, eligibility criteria, process, arms export control, and direct commercial sales. The direct commercial sales and arms export control issues appear again in the conclusion as recommendations to improve U.S. FMS timelines and end-user monitoring.

U.S. FMS History

The U.S. FMS program derives from the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (ACDA) and U.S. Foreign Assistance Act (USFAA) of 1961.¹ The purpose of the ACDA is to control and reduce the worldwide population of destructive armaments, including nuclear weapons, and ostensibly prevent another world war. The governing agency established for this effort was the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It developed arms control and disarmament policies and negotiated and participated in arms control negotiations and agreements.²

The purpose of the USFAA is to promote foreign policy, security, and welfare of the United States by aiding foreign nations in developing economically and socially,

¹ The National Archives, *Act of September 26, 1961 (Arms Control and Disarmament Act)*, Public Law 87-297, 75 STAT 631, which established the United States Arms and Control and Disarmament Agency, <http://research.archives.gov/description/299875> (accessed November 20, 2014).

² Ibid.

coupled with developing internal and external security assistance.³ The governing agency established to implement the USFAA was the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).⁴

The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) formed in 1961 to manage foreign security cooperation activities. In 1976, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) authorized the United States to sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President, through national security advisors, formally finds doing so will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.⁵ The DSAA was renamed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in 1989. DCSA oversees FMS and International Military Education and Training activities under AECA authorities.⁶

FMS Purpose and Definition

According to DSCA:

FMS is operated on a “no-profit” and “no-loss” basis to the U.S. Government (USG). Through the FMS program, the Department of Defense (DoD) procures defense articles and services for partner nations using the same acquisition process used to procure for its own military needs. The purchaser benefits from DoD technical and operational expertise, existing procurement infrastructure, transparent purchasing practices, and the lower unit costs that can result when the DoD is able to combine a partner’s procurement with one of its own.⁷

³ U.S. House of Representatives, *The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, <http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf> (accessed November 10, 2014).

⁴ While USAID does not play a role in FMS, it is important to note the U.S. whole-of-government approach to supported nations.

⁵ Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA website), “Foreign Military Sales,” <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-sales-fms> (accessed December 12, 2014).

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Memorandum, Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive # 40 Redesignation of the Defense Security Assistance Agency as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency*, <http://www.defense.gov/dodreform/drids/drid40.html>, (accessed December 12, 2014).

⁷ DSCA website, <http://www.dsca.mil/>, (accessed December 9, 2014).

Under the authority, direction, and control of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the DSCA directs, administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions abroad, for the execution of DoD security assistance and security cooperation programs over which DSCA has responsibility.⁸ DSCA also conducts and oversees other DoD assistance programs such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, international education and training, and defense institution building.⁹

FMS Eligibility Criteria

Four Presidential criteria determine FMS eligibility:

1. Furnishing of defense articles and services strengthens U.S. security and promotes world peace.
2. The country or organization shall not transfer articles or services without prior authorization.
3. The country or organization shall maintain security of articles or services.
4. The country or organization is otherwise eligible.

Even if a nation meets the criteria, it is not guaranteed FMS program assistance or the associated funding approval or assistance. The Department of State (DoS) determines who will receive FMS assistance and DoD/DSCA is the executive agent.¹⁰ In 2013, the U.S. had FMS agreements with over 200 nations worldwide worth over \$23 billion dollars.¹¹

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Directive 5105.65*, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 26 October 2012) 1-2, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510565p.pdf>, (accessed November 11, 2014).

⁹ DSCA website, "Programs," www.dsca.mil/programs (accessed December 6, 2014).

¹⁰ DSCA website, "Foreign Military Sales," (accessed December 6, 2014).

¹¹ DSCA website, "Historical Facts Book," 2013, <http://www.dsca.mil/resources/dsca-historical-facts-book-fiscal-year-series> (accessed April 1, 2015).

FMS Process

The FMS process involves six main steps and fosters long-term security cooperation.¹²

1. The requesting country submits a Letter of Request (LoR) for defense articles or services.
2. USG agencies conduct LoR special reviews, if necessary, for sensitive items.
3. LoR Congressional notification occurs, if necessary. The threshold for notification is \$14M.
4. The requesting country requests a Letter of Authorization (LoA).
5. The USG sends the LOA to the requesting country to provide articles or services.
6. The FMS case is executed, delivered, reported, billed, completed, and closed.

The FMS process is linear by design and arranges the procurement of U.S. defense articles and services for foreign nations to support long-term security cooperation. At the same time, it ensures quality and export control, security management review of sensitive items, end-user monitoring, and assesses defense impacts on the destination country and region. Given the number of steps and approvals required, major end items such as aircraft can take up to seven years for delivery. This often frustrates requesting governments, as it did with Iraq and its F-16 delivery, and causes them to look elsewhere for procurement, discussed in detail in Chapter 5 regarding Russia.

U.S. Arms Export

U.S. arms sales, including FMS, promote national security, regional stability, stimulate the U.S. and foreign economies, and spread U.S. influence. Conversely, U.S. arms sales increase the total global arms population and the United States often cannot

¹² Al Teeny, "United States Government Benefits as a Result of Foreign Military Sales Programs," *The DISAM Journal* 31, no. 4, (March 2010): 73-77, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/documents/pubs/journals/volume_31-4.pdf (accessed November 8, 2014).

control arms distribution, despite well-designed efforts, once weapons arrive at the end-user nation.¹³ As seen in Iraq and with the case of ISIL, the capture and malign use of U.S. weapons and technology is possible.

In January of 2014, the USG released an updated conventional arms transfer policy. The directive expanded on criteria to reflect world events such as the Arab Spring: promote cooperative counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection and other homeland security priorities, and combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security.¹⁴ Additionally, the directive added two new review criteria. The first addresses the possibility that a country's political-military environment status may allow inappropriate end-use or transfer of U.S. defense articles. The second addition adds a new layer of review.

... the likelihood that the recipient would use the arms to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law, retransfer the arms to those who would commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law, or identify the United States with human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law.¹⁵

In Iraq's case, there is evidence that U.S. arms are used by actors that the United States would not approve, such as Shia militias in the fight against ISIL.¹⁶ This requires careful end-user monitoring to ensure U.S.-made equipment is not involved in violations of international humanitarian law or ethno-sectarian based targeting.

¹³ Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, "The Case Against a U.S. Arms Monopoly," (working paper, George Mason University Department of Economics Working Paper 13-32, September 15, 2013), 1-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326060 (accessed December 10, 2014).

¹⁴ Rachel Stohl, "Promoting Restraint: Updated Rules for U.S. Arms Transfer Policy," *Armscontrol.org*, March 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Promoting-Restraint-Updated-Rules-for-US-Arms-Transfer-Policy (accessed November 6, 2014).

¹⁵ Ibid. The policy changes were consistent with the Leahy Amendments, 22 U.S. Code 2378d, which limits security force assistance to nations likely to commit human rights violations.

¹⁶ Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, "Iran-backed Militias are Getting U.S. Weapons," *Bloombergview.com*, January 8, 2015, <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-08/iranbacked-militias-are-getting-us-weapons-in-iraq> (accessed January 8, 2015).

Finally, the updated directive emphasized U.S. and global restraint on arms transfers, designed to set global policy norms for other nations to follow.¹⁷ This differed from the prior directive, which was oriented towards transfer of weapons that could destabilize international peace in a state-on-state context.¹⁸

Direct Commercial Sales

There are other options for foreign nations to obtain U.S. weapons and services, including Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Under DCS, U.S. companies obtain commercial export licenses from DoS, allowing them to negotiate with, and sell directly to, U.S. partners. As with FMS, DCS are subject to applicable U.S. exports laws and regulations and the approval of the DoS.¹⁹ FMS does not compete with DCS, the approval criteria are generally the same, and DCS may benefit the purchasing nation with fixed contract pricing during negotiations and delivery.²⁰ DCS may be a good option to pursue more aggressively in the future to alleviate USG burden and buyer frustration considering some of the delivery timelines and other FMS execution issues. Additionally, an increased DCS solution may permit increased end-user monitoring by military and contract personnel as resources are relieved. End-user monitoring remains crucial to ensuring U.S. equipment and technology does not fall into adversarial hands.

¹⁷ Setting global policy norms is not likely, however the United States can use instruments of national power to influence nations that do not restrain arms transfers and seek to fill an open arms market.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ DSCA website, "Resources/FAQ", <http://www.dsca.mil/resources/faq> (accessed December 10, 2014).

²⁰ Ibid.

Chapter 4

U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Iraq

Introduction

The chapter provides the reader a case study of U.S. to Iraq FMS. The study notes the history, challenges, and benefits of U.S. to Iraq FMS, including a by year account of major end item purchases and the challenge Iraq and the United States had completing the F-16 purchase. The chapter also includes U.S. regional sales comparisons to highlight differences between those countries and Iraq.

History

The United States began its FMS program to Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) primarily to counter Iranian influence and aggression.²¹ That threat did not materialize in state form, but rather through Iranian proxy Shia militant groups, including Jaysh al-Mahdi and others.²² From 2004 to 2006, the United States began training ISF to fight AQI, Sunni extremists and Shia militant groups. By 2007, the U.S. approach focused on building a unified state and developing ISF to fight extremists and militants, and eventually defend against external threats.²³

Of the approximately \$35 billion of FMS sales offered between the United States and Iraq from 2005-2012, \$19 billion was paid for by Iraq, and only \$8 billion of that was approved or implemented by the USG.²⁴ Of that \$8 billion, only \$3 billion delivered to

²¹ William D. Hartung, "Arming Iraq: Aid Sales 2005-2012," *Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy*, 1-5, http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/From_Aid_to_Sales1.pdf, (accessed December 12, 2014).

²² Kimberly Kagan, "Iran's Proxy War Against the United States and the Iraqi Government," May 2006-August 20, 2007, <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/irans-proxy-war-against-united-states-and-iraq> (accessed October 5, 2014).

²³ Cordesman and Khazai, 7.

²⁴ Hartung, 1-5.

case completion. These numbers highlight the size and scope of U.S. and Iraq FMS efforts and some of the fiscal and delivery issues.²⁵ In comparison, from 2005-2012, the United States offered approximately \$54 billion in FMS to Saudi Arabia, of which approximately \$10 billion delivered to case completion.²⁶

A quick analysis shows that the United States delivered on approximately 10 percent of all Iraq agreements and 20 percent of all Saudi Arabia agreements, likely due to streamlined processes with a stable and cooperative Saudi government not mired in a civil war. It is also important to note that FMS agreements, sales, and deliveries are an ongoing process, one in which the details and difficulties, or backlogs, are often difficult to identify and correct. The largest Iraq FMS deals, over \$1 billion, happened between 2008 and 2012; equipment included M1A1 tanks, helicopters, and 36 F-16 fighter jets. These deals together totaled approximately \$23 billion.²⁷ Table 1 notes the deals over \$1 billion.²⁸

²⁵ According to Hartung's article, "the \$35 billion figure was arrived at by tallying the value of letters of offer for FMS that were notified to Congress between 2005 and the end of 2012. This can also be tallied on the DSCA website." The \$35 billion may not all translate into final sales.

²⁶ DSCA website, "Historical Facts Book," 2012, <http://www.dsca.mil/resources/dsca-historical-facts-book-fiscal-year-series> (accessed September 10, 2014).

²⁷ Hartung, 1-5.

²⁸ Ibid.

Table 1

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Item</u> | <u>FMS Value</u> |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| 2011 | 18 F-16 jets | 2.3 billion |
| 2010 | 18 F-16 jets | 4.2 billion |
| 2009 | Various helicopters | 1.2 billion |
| 2008 | 140 M1A1 tanks | 2.2 billion |
| 2008 | Combat ships | 1.0 billion |
| 2008 | Stryker armored vehicles | 1.1 billion |
| 2008 | M1A1 tanks | 2.2 billion |
| 2008 | Various helicopters | 2.2 billion |
| 2008 | Light armored vehicles | 3.0 billion |
| 2008 | C-130 aircraft | 1.5 billion |
| 2008 | Vehicles, radar systems, uniforms | 1.4 billion |

Challenges

U.S.-Iraq FMS deals faced numerous and repetitive challenges including lengthy approval and delivery timelines, foreign competition, and Iraqi corruption at the highest levels of government. The F-16 fighter jet FMS case illustrates the difficulties of requesting, approving, and delivering military sales to Iraq.

Iraq indicated interest in U.S. F-16 sales as early as 2005. Once Maliki's government was in place, Iraq sent a LoR for 18 F-16s in 2010. DSCA notified Congress of the LoR and Congress approved the sale within the required 30-day period. The USG responded with a LoA in the same year, collected bids, and Lockheed Martin became the contract lead. Lockheed began production, which it expected to last into 2014. Iraqi pilots began F-16 training in the United States in 2010 and Iraq made a LoR for an additional 18 F-16 jets in 2011. The approved LoR resulted in Iraq's first payment in 2011 and the

first two F-16s delivered to Iraqi government representatives in 2014 in Texas.²⁹ The aircraft did not ship to Iraq due to ISIL security concerns.³⁰

The F-16 basing plan for Balad Air Base north of Baghdad began to unravel in early 2014 as ISIL seized territory. Almost all U.S. contractors, including those for F-16 support, departed Iraq and did not return. The F-16 delivery program remains on hold pending the improvement of the security situation in Iraq.³¹ The first two U.S.-trained Iraqi pilots will not be combat qualified until sometime in FY2017.³² Due to a combination of events and procedures, Iraq does not have F-16s in country 10 years after indicating interest, 5 years after the LoR and pilots began training, and 4 years after Iraq's first payment. However, the F-16 variant Iraq ordered is an upgrade and required modifications, it is a major end item, and pilots require extensive training, which exacerbates already frustrated delivery timelines. In comparison, Egypt ordered 24 F-16s from the U.S. in 1999; all delivered by 2002, probably due to existing agreements, past order success, and the F-16s were older models.³³ The USG continues to provide other FMS to Iraq such as ammunition, weapons, and missiles to combat ISIL.³⁴ Long lead-time procurement continues on the remaining F-16s.

²⁹ Cheryl Pellerin, "Iraq Makes First Payment for F-16 Fighters," *American Forces Press Service*, September 28, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65470> (accessed December 13, 2014).

³⁰ Chris Carroll, "Iraqi F-16s Being Delivered to Pilots in Training in Arizona," November 10, 2014, <http://www.stripes.com/news/iraqi-f-16s-being-delivered-to-pilots-training-in-arizona-1.313467> (accessed December 13, 2014).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Jeff Schogol, "Iraqi Pilots Need Years More Training in the U.S.," December 11, 2014, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2014/12/11/iraqi-f16-pilots-need-years-more-training-in-us/20249705/> (accessed December 14, 2014).

³³ F16.net, http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article4.html, (accessed April 1, 2015).

³⁴ DSCA website, "Major Arms Sales," <http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales> (accessed January 25, 2015).

Benefits and Regional Comparison

Both the United States and Iraq benefit from FMS deals. This government-to-government method for selling defense articles, services, and training enhances U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral defense relations, supporting coalition building, enabling joint training programs. When the USG sells a fighter-jet package to Iraq, it in effect enters the two nations into a possibly decades-long security agreement for training, maintenance, and upgrade support.³⁵ This long-term intangible benefit is one reason why FMS is a primary security cooperation tool for the USG as security cooperation increases interdependence between two nations and reduces the chance of conflict.

A comparison of U.S. to regional FMS is useful in the context of U.S. to Iraq FMS. U.S. FMS to other Middle East partners include Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Large military sales to Egypt are on-hold pending that government's stability and trajectory.³⁶ As of 2003, the United States used FMS as a foreign policy tool and as a means to garner support for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the Middle East. This concept encouraged support against terrorism and precipitated a large influx of arms into the region. From 2005 to 2012, the countries in Table 2 made FMS agreements with the United States.³⁷

³⁵ Al Teeney, "United States Government Benefits as a Result of Foreign Military Sales Programs," 73-74.

³⁶ James Drew, "State Department: F-16 Deliveries on Hold at Iraq's Balad Air Base," The James Drew Blog posted August 25, 2014, <http://jamesdrewjournalist.com/tag/f-16/> (accessed September 9, 2014). As of April 2015, the USG indicated military sales to Egypt would resume.

³⁷ DSCA website, "Historical Facts Book," <http://www.dsca.mil/resources/dsca-historical-facts-book-fiscal-year-series> (accessed September 10, 2014).

Table 2

| <u>Country</u> | <u>FMS Value</u> |
|----------------|------------------|
| Israel | \$10 billion |
| Jordan | \$2 billion |
| Egypt | \$10 billion |
| Saudi Arabia | \$52 billion |
| Iraq | \$23 billion |

The figures show that Iraq became the second largest FMS agreement country in order to rebuild its defunct security apparatus, and likely to show U.S. commitment to Iraq as a regional democratic nation and partner against terrorism.

Chapter 5

Russian Military Sales to Iraq

Introduction

Iraq has a long history of receiving FMS from Russia, dating back to the 1960s. The Iraqis are more familiar with Russian equipment than U.S. equipment, and continue to procure from Russia. Russia-to-Iraq FMS benefits provide the best comparison to U.S.-Iraq sales because Russia is the primary U.S. FMS competitor in Iraq. Although Iraq enjoys a healthy FMS relationship with Russia, there are challenges and benefits to both countries, including corruption and speed of delivery, respectively.

Iraq may be comfortable with Russian military equipment, however, procurement deals between Russia and Iraq, compared to the U.S. and Iraq, show that Iraq prefers U.S. military equipment at better than a 11:1 spending rate. It is important to assesses Russia to Iraq FMS sales should the United States change its FMS strategy in Iraq per recommendations in this paper.

History

Iraq and Russia have enjoyed extensive arms sales agreements since the 1960s, and Iraq received most of its major end item equipment from Russia until 2003.

According to a RAND study,

After the mid-1970s, Iraq diversified the countries from which it imported weapons in an effort to lessen the leverage that suppliers could exert on it. Historically, the Soviet Union had been Iraq's primary supplier...although this diversification of sources may have produced a logistic nightmare, it gave Iraq access to highly advanced military technologies in several categories of weapons.¹

¹ Rachel Schmidt, "Global Arms Exports to Iraq 1960-1990," *A RAND Report*, 1991, v, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N3248.pdf>, (accessed December 14, 2014).

According to a Rand study, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Iraq purchased \$63 billion in arms from Russia. This period signaled the focus of an Iraqi military built around a Russian equipment base, yet Iraq continued diversifying purchases from other countries, including France. The same study noted later that exporting nations must balance benefits derived from weapons sales against the risk that they may have to fight the importer, in that case Saddam Hussein, and in the case of this thesis, ISIL.²

In 2013, fifteen countries received weaponry from both the United States and Russia, including Brazil, India, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Of these 15, the country that received the highest dollar amount of U.S. weaponry was the United Arab Emirates, with more than \$3.7 billion in arms received. Russia dealt the greatest value of weapons to India, sending more than \$13.6 billion.

Also in 2013, Iraq imported weapons from the United States and Russia, \$916 million and \$81 million of weapons worth, respectively.³ Interestingly, the United States received roughly \$16 million worth of weaponry from Russia the same year. This was part of a \$1 billion helicopter deal the two nations made so the United States could supply Afghan security forces familiar equipment.⁴ The Afghan case illustrates the complicated nature of U.S. and Russian military equipment sales. The United States buys some weapons from Russia, and then Russia and the United States sell weapons in competition to Iraq. Iraq prefers U.S. weapons due to technological superiority, but is more familiar with Russian equipment, which is easier to obtain and usually not delayed because of extensive approval and procurement timelines.

² Ibid

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

Challenges and Benefits

Iraq's weapons procurement from Russia may seem beneficial to Iraqi political and military leadership based on expedited delivery timelines and equipment familiarity. However, Russian equipment mixed with U.S., French, and other equipment provides a logistical, supply, and maintenance challenge to the fledgling ISF and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which has not proven capable to man, train, or equip the ISF since 2003 without significant U.S. assistance.⁵

Russia faced Iraq arms challenges as well. In 2012, Iraq and Russian reportedly signed a \$3 billion arms deal for expedited delivery of weapons, including jet aircraft. The deal fell apart in 2013 with the Iraqi government citing high-levels of corruption present in its own government dealings.⁶ As of October 2014, Iraq reportedly signed a deal with Russia worth over \$4 billion dollars for equipment including air defense systems, helicopters, and jet aircraft.⁷ Any major sales to Russia likely cuts into U.S. FMS sales, however it is not a threat to U.S. to Iraq FMS supremacy and security cooperation.

⁵ Cordesman and Khazai, 222.

⁶ Awad Mustafa, "Russia Making Major Push Into Mideast Market," *Defense News*, Oct 22, 2014, <http://mobile.defensenews.com/article/310180029> (accessed November 4, 2014).

⁷ Ibid.

Chapter 6

Iraq and Russia FMS Decisions

Introduction

This chapter uses Graham Allison's decision-making models to analyze Iraq's past FMS decisions and provide insight into future decisions. It first analyzes Iraq past actions and decisions regarding U.S and Russian FMS, and then Russia's decision-making regarding FMS to Iraq to understand why Russia pursues Iraqi arms deals. While it is an assessment, it does provide a framework in which to analyze and predict future decisions. New Iraqi PM Haidar al-Abadi is a rational actor, as is Russian President Vladimir Putin. Arms deals and decisions between the two countries likely will continue, but not threaten U.S. FMS or security cooperation activities in Iraq.¹

Iraq Decisions on U.S. and Russian FMS

In the case of the U.S. and Iraq FMS, the Iraqi Government's decisions primarily illustrate the rational actor model, with smaller pieces of the government politics model present. One may argue that Maliki was hardly rational, but the emotional interpretation does not apply here. Referring to the rational actor model, the governmental action was a choice, which Maliki made pursuing FMS deals with the United States, Russia, and others to solve Iraq's security problem. The problem was Iraq had a very weak external defense capability compared to regional neighbors after OIF. The invasion destroyed

¹ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1999), 273-278. Allison provides three conceptual models to aid in understanding decision-making. The rational actor model links purpose to action normally through an individual leader. In the organizational behavior model, acts and choices are outputs of organizational patterns and behavior. Allison's third model, the governmental politics model, focuses on politics inside the government that provides a bargained solution or decision.

entire Iraqi Army divisions, air defense capabilities, and governmental infrastructure. Maliki's choice to sign FMS deals with both the United States and Russia was a rational choice; the consequences of not doing something was a failed or failing state, threatened by Iran and other regional neighbors, and Maliki losing his seat. If Iraq was to be secure, it needed new military equipment and fast.

Maliki's procurement decisions with the United States and Russia maximized the value towards his and the state's main ends, which were security and defensibility. The United States and Russia offered deals quickly, and decreased Maliki's perception of the costs, literally and figuratively. The United States financed many of the first large deals on credit until Iraq could build up its oil income, and gifted billions of dollars' worth of equipment to stand up the ISF.² Maliki's competing purchases were a rational actor response to both internal and external threats.

Tenets of the governmental politics model are present because organizational actors, such as Iraq's MoD and the Ministry of Interior, desired the same capabilities and there were pressured deadlines for action, including deteriorating security. Maliki had to balance procurement with Sunni and Kurdish concerns regarding a concentration of power around Baghdad and Maliki himself. Maliki bargained with the Kurds by assuring them they would receive Baghdad's security assistance, but not U.S. direct FMS sales. This quickly devolved into those regions' security forces consisting of those regions' personnel only with little help from Baghdad. Again, Maliki's autocratic actions and ethno-sectarian fears determined the result, which ultimately resulted in ISIL rolling-up

² Elizabeth Dwoskin and Gopal Ratnam, "U.S. Military Rushes to Ship Out Eight Years of Iraq War Gear," *Bloomberg.com*, December 14, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-15/u-s-military-rushes-to-ship-out-eight-years-of-iraq-war-gear> (accessed November 3, 2014).

Mosul with little resistance because widespread ISF assistance was not available.³

Despite any effect a new PM might have, Iraq likely will continue to make decisions consistent with the rational actor model as it is expected a singular, Shia leader will continue to represent all of Iraq when making national-level decisions.

Russian Decisions on Sales to Iraq

Russia's FMS to Iraq reflects a decision of the organizational behavior model. Although President Vladimir Putin is a rational actor in charge of Russian foreign policy, Russia's Communist Party policies and worldview still drive decisions. Its choices are outputs of organizational patterns and behavior, in this case to promote security cooperation with nations in the Middle East, as seen in Iran and Syria. The centralized command and control structure determines best where to engage foreign nations, and why. In this case, although Russia will benefit economically from the deals, it also retains an on-the-ground interest in Iraq.⁴

FMS to Iraq is within Russian existing capabilities and unlike the United States, Russia does not usually tie FMS deals to political qualifiers, such as promoting democratic governance and human rights. Russia is addressing Iraq's needs, Russia's economy, and attempting to check U.S. influence, or at least present an alternative to it, by making large deals and delivering on-hand equipment quickly.⁵

³ Cordesman and Khazai, xii.

⁴ James Kittfield, "How Putin Outmaneuvered the US in Resupplying the Iraqi Military," *Yahoo News*, July 9, 2014, <http://news.yahoo.com/how-the-u-s--is-letting-russia-beat-them-to-the-punch-on-military-aid-to-iraq-203343350.html> (accessed September 8, 2014).

⁵ Schmidt, v.

Chapter 7

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Iraqi Security Forces, and New War

Future conflicts could range from hybrid contingencies against proxy groups using asymmetric approaches, to a high-end conflict against a state power armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction or technologically advanced anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Reflecting this diverse range of challenges, the U.S. military will shift focus in terms of what kinds of conflicts it prepares for in the future, moving toward greater emphasis on the full spectrum of possible operations. Although our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁶

Introduction

The chapter discusses the characteristics of the forces and fighting between ISIL and ISF in a new war context. ISIL fights in an asymmetric and terroristic manner, which the ISF was not prepared to counter, resulting in the fall of Mosul and the rise of ISIL across the region. The discussion then applies the concept of new war theory and assesses how FMS can best help address ISF shortcomings in the fight against ISIL.

ISIL Posture

ISIL is comprised of 20,000 to 30,000 former AQI, Syrian opposition, and foreign fighters.⁷ In January of 2014, ISIL elements seized part of al-Anbar province in Iraq and in June seized Mosul, Iraq's second largest city. With Mosul's seizure, ISIL captured up to four Iraqi Army divisions' worth of equipment, including tanks, Stryker vehicles, High Mobility Multiple Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), towable artillery, arms, and

⁶ U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2014), VII.

⁷ "The CIA Thinks ISIS Could Have Nearly 32,000 Fighters," *Agence-France Press*, September 11, 2014, <http://www.businessinsider.com/cia-islamic-state-2014-9#ixzz3OASySpOj> (accessed January 7, 2014).

ammunition, much of which resulted from U.S to Iraq FMS dealings.⁸ ISIL is a highly mobile force, capable of moving rapidly via military or non-military vehicles in Iraq and between Syria and Iraq.⁹ ISIL has general freedom of movement in the area and maintains control of parts of western Syria and other portions of al-Anbar province and western and northern Iraq.¹⁰ It funds operations between a combination of black market oil dealings, kidnap and ransom, extortion, bribery, patronage, and criminal activity.¹¹ ISIL has an estimated net value of over \$2 billion dollars, the largest ever for a terrorist group.¹²

ISF Posture

The ISF has approximately 339,000 active duty soldiers, including Shia militia and Kurdish Peshmerga. The ISF had up to 14 divisions manned throughout Iraq until Mosul fell; the number of divisions and total personnel is now unknown because of reported “ghost soldiers,” which exist only on paper for pay and benefits.¹³ ISF

⁸ Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “The Iraqi Army Was Crumbling Long Before Its Collapse, U.S. Officials Say,” *New York Times*, June 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/world/middleeast/american-intelligence-officials-said-iraqi-military-had-been-in-decline.html?_r=0 (accessed January 6, 2014).

⁹ Ahmed Ali, Jessica D. Lewis, and Kimberly Kagan, “The ISIS Battle Plan,” *Understandingwar.org*, June 12, 2014, <http://www.understandingwar.org/background/isis-battle-plan> (accessed September 10, 2014).

¹⁰ Securitydata.newamerica.net, “International Security, How much of Iraq does ISIS control?,” <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/isis/analysis> (accessed December 20, 2014).

¹¹ CNN News, Scott Bronstein and Drew Griffin, “Self-funded and Deep-rooted: How ISIS Makes its Millions,” CNN.com, October 7, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/middleeast/isis-funding/> (accessed November 1, 2014).

¹² BBC News, “Syria Iraq: The Islamic State militant Group,” BBC.com, August 2, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084> (accessed September 2, 2014).

¹³ Michael Knights, “Bringing Iraq's 'Ghost' Forces Back to Life,” *aljazeera.com*, December 10, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/bringing-iraq-ghost-forces-back--20141288397979792.html> (accessed January 10, 2015).

equipment provided by the United States and allies includes 336 tanks, 140 of which are M1A1 Abrams, 3,600 armored personnel carriers, and 1,300 artillery pieces.¹⁴

From 2006 to 2014, former PM Maliki almost singularly controlled the ISF. He marginalized Sunni and Kurdish commanders, emplaced loyal commanders, and personally directed combat operations at the tactical level. His control of the ISF and the marginalization of Sunni forces were the major reasons why ISF were combat ineffective during the June 2014 fight for Mosul. Additionally, the ISF is unable to provide logistics, supply, and intelligence support for its own forces owing to corruption, hoarding, cannibalism, and basic lack of subject matter expertise. This endemic problem challenges all basic ISF warfighting functions and is common no matter from which country Iraq purchases arms.¹⁵

New War and Iraq

New wars are the wars in an era of globalization, defined in part by the breaking down of state, political, and economic systems. New war tenets include a globalized military enemy, war at the individual or group level, decentralization of violence, and citizens as key targets of violence.¹⁶ New wars are state disintegrating wars, short wars between states, long wars within societies, and the victims are targeted internal civilian populations. New wars are cheap to conduct, mainly consisting of light weapons for fighting, and use of civilian infrastructure for massacre and ambush. Militaries, militias, terrorists, criminals, and other members are undisciplined, have little or no ethics or value

¹⁴ Sam Jones and Borzou Daragahi, "Iraq's Security Forces Ill-Equipped to Face Militants," *Financial Times*, July 10, 2014, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a089e41e-081c-11e4-9afc-00144feab7de.html#axzz3NzodzFg3>, (accessed on December 12, 2014).

¹⁵ Cordesman and Khazai, 222.

¹⁶ Mary Kaldor, "In Defence of New Wars," *The Stability Journal*, <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.at/41> (accessed February 20, 2015).

for human life, and they steal, rape, and kill at will.¹⁷ New wars do not necessarily replace old wars, but require a rethinking and reframing of the problem to determine an operational approach to defeat the enemy, in this case, ISIL.

The fight against ISIL presents as a new war, given the above criteria. In contrast, the ISF continue to fight using an old war mentality. Old war is the traditional, state on state war, an armed dispute between state political groups with rules and limitations, and an expected political endstate. When Lieutenant General Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, second in command of Iraq's elite counterterrorism (CT) force, set to retake the oil refinery at Beiji in June 2014, he had 225 fighters, a single M1A1 tank, a pair of mortars, 2 artillery pieces, and about 40 armored HMMWVs. He took 30 days to move 25 miles due to improvised explosive device placement and ISIL harassment before his forces laid siege to Beiji.¹⁸ He later stated,

"Iraq's military lacks weapons, equipment and battle-ready troops and (he) complained that U.S. air support was erratic. Both the military and the government remain riddled with corruption. Most of the senior generals serving when the military fell apart had skills 'more suited to World War II.'"¹⁹

The battle for Beiji highlights Iraq's problems facing a new war ISIL foe.

Although one could argue the general's force was right-sized, its slow movement was detrimental to the mission and provided time and space for ISIL to adapt. His statement was indicative of an old war mentality pervasive in the ISF.

¹⁷ Herfried Munkler, *The New Wars*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 1-31.

¹⁸ Hamza Hendawi and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Iraqi General Warns of Military Woes in Fighting Islamic State Militants," *New York Times*, January 2, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/02/world/middleeast/ap-ml-iraq-a-generals-view.html> (accessed January 6, 2014).

¹⁹ Ibid.

New War and FMS

As noted earlier in this thesis, U.S. to Iraq FMS sales focused on major end items and systems including tanks and F-16s. This does not discount concurrent small arms, missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, and ammunition deals. However, it highlights the emphasis on power-projection and old war type equipment when the Iraqi government should look internally first, at weapons, equipment, and training for the broader ISF force to execute CT missions and border security operations. The external threat to Iraq, beyond ISIL, is negligible if it remains peaceful to Middle East neighbors and the United States. U.S. to Iraq FMS should enable the fight against a new war ISIL foe and not be mired down in external defense equipment, which takes years to deliver. New War FMS does not only apply to Iraq, but to other nations experiencing ISIL or other asymmetric and terrorist threats.

Chapter 8

U.S. and Iraq Foreign Military Sales – The Way Ahead

To forge true partnerships and worthwhile strategic networks requires that partner militaries not only be de-politicized and inoculated against corruption, but that those in uniform reorient themselves toward earning their citizens' trust. Otherwise, it is hard to see how Washington will ever build reliable partnerships to obviate anti-state and non-state actors that pose trans-national threats.¹

Conclusion

The United States remains Iraq's preferred FMS provider and provides emergent equipment and support to Iraq during the fight against ISIL while continuing long lead-time FMS production. Although Iraqi leaders are often frustrated with FMS timelines, they realize they can depend on the United States for immediate support when needed, and quick FMS response to ISIL threats encourages faith over longer FMS timelines. Iraq will continue to conduct FMS deals with other countries, primarily Russia, for a variety of reasons including diversification and price. However, Russia's FMS influence in Iraq is not a threat to U.S. interests.

Despite the risk of some U.S. equipment falling into ISIL possession or used by Shia militia under the guise of ISF, U.S. to Iraq FMS remains the primary security cooperation tool. U.S. FMS strategy in Iraq should focus on counterterrorism operations, increase end-user monitoring of U.S. equipment, and increase direct commercial sales to defeat ISIL in a new war context. The recommendations seek to inform U.S. policymakers on future U.S. FMS strategy to Iraq and other countries where FMS agreements do not address asymmetric threat requirements or meet expected delivery timelines.

¹ Anna Simons, "Rebalancing U.S. Military Power," *Parameters*, Issue 43-4, (Winter 2013-2014): 44.

Recommendations

The U.S. and Iraq should first prioritize FMS arms transfer and training for CT and border security operations given the nature of the fight against ISIL. The ISF and most of the government remain in an old war mindset. There must be appreciation for fighting ISIL in a new war context and procurement should focus on weapons and training to that end.

Next, the United States should increase U.S. liaison officer and foreign national presence and capability to monitor end-user agreements and decrease transfer of U.S. equipment to adversaries including ISIL and Shia militia. This is difficult considering constrained resources and a limited U.S. presence on the ground in Iraq. However, given the urgency of the fight against ISIL, the Iraqi government likely would be amenable to an increased OSC-I presence.

Last, the United States should increase DCS to help alleviate USG administrative program management burden and mitigate buyer frustration with the FMS process and timelines. Allow the Iraqi government to work directly with U.S. vendors, provided U.S. oversight mechanisms are in place. In a best-case scenario, increasing DCS may free up U.S. resources to aid in end-user monitoring.

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